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THE QUESTION OF NON HUMAN PRIMATES 
MORALITY 
He who understands baboons
would do more toward metaphysics
than Locke.
Ch. Darwin, Notebook
Introduction
Walking in Darwin’s footsteps, numerous researchers have turned toward 
evolutionary theory for “the examination of a hypothesis concerning the factual 
matter of whether, and in what sense, and to what degree, human morality is the 
product of the process of biological natural selection.”1 The questions of morality 
have been partly taken over from the hands of philosophers and “biologized” as 
E.O. Wilson already recommended more than three decades ago.2 In spite of the 
fundamental disputes undertaken in general evolutionary theory, many specifi c 
empirical disciplines work on the adequate description and explication of partic-
ular morality-related issues. Neuroscience tries to map the “moral brain,” mean-
while by examining children in their earliest years, developmental psychology 
studies ontogenetic changes in the processes of moral reasoning and the emer-
gence of the distinction between moral and other norms. Moral psychology stud-
ies universal cognitive and emotional psychological mechanisms related with 
morality (e.g. moral judgments, moral dilemmas) and “universal across cultures 
moral domains.” Recently, primatology has also contributed to the “biologizing of 
morality” enterprise, mainly by searching for and examining “proto-morality” or 
“the evolutionary building blocks of morality” in non human primates (hereafter 
termed NHP). The primatological studies are a part of the emerging literature 
on the “animal morality” question,3 but without a doubt research on NHP cur-
1  R. Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 2006, p. 143.
2  E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
1975, p. 562.
3  C. McGinn, Animal Minds, Animal Morality – In the Company of Animals, “Social Re-
search” 1995, vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 731–748; M. Bekoff, Social Play Behavior: Cooperation, Fairness, 
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rently provides the most robust and well documented account of moral related 
phenomena in non human animals.
There is a relatively small but growing body of studies hinting that NHP 
posses some cognitive and emotional capacities closely connected with what 
we commonly understand as morality but it should be clearly noted that only 
a few primatologists have directly analyzed the question of “proto-morality” 
or “the evolutionary building blocks of morality” in NHP.4 About 30 years ago, 
H. Kummer informed in us in his seminal paper of the complete lack of inter-
est in the subject of NHP morality.5 From the larger perspective, M. Bekoff and 
J. Pierce recently claimed that “the idea of animal morality would have been met 
with eyebrows and a ‘surely you must be joking!’ dismissal.”6 Most primatolo-
gists to date have avoided the word “morality,” using instead the more neutral 
and technical-sounding or more specifi c terms such as pro-social behaviour, co-
operation, biological altruism and “reading other minds” capacities. In contrast 
to the relatively small amounts of primatological works analyzing the problem 
of morality in NHP directly, there are many studies referring to those results 
because the data collected by primatologists are being used as an argument for 
or against the thesis that human morality (or moral sense) is innate.7
Trust, and the Evolution of Morality, “Journal of Consciousness Studies” 2001, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 
81–90; Wild Justice and Fair Play: Cooperation, Forgiveness, and Morality in Animals, “Biology 
and Philosophy” 2004, vol. 19, pp. 489–520; Animal Passions and Beastly Virtues: Cognitive 
Ethology as the Unifying Science for Understanding the Subjective, Eotional, Empathic, and 
Moral Lives of Animals, “Human Ecology Review” 2006, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 39–59; P. Shapiro, 
Moral Agency in Other Animals, “Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics” 2006, vol. 27, pp. 357–373; 
L.A. Bates et al., Do Elephants Show Empathy?, “Journal of Consciousness Studies” 2008, 
vol. 15, no. 10–11, pp. 204–225; M. Bekoff, J. Pierce, Wild Justice. The Moral Lives of Animals, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2009.
4  H. Kummer, Analogs of morality among nonhuman primates [in:] G.S. Stent (ed.), Morality 
as a biological phenomenon, University of California Press, Berkeley 1980, pp. 31–47; Ch. Boehm, 
The Evolutionary Development of Morality as an Effect of Dominance Behavior and Confl ict 
Interference [in:] M. Gruter, P. Bohannan, Ross-Erikson (eds.), Law, Biology and Culture: The 
Evolution of Law, Santa Barbara 1983, pp. 134–147; F. de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins 
of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
1996; idem, Homo homini lupus? Morality, the Social Instincts, and our Fellow Primates [in:] 
J.P. Changeux et al. (eds.), Neurobiology of Human Values, Springer, Berlin 2005, pp. 17–35; 
Primates and Philosophers, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006; D. Harnden-Warwick, 
Psychological Realism, Morality, and Chimpanzees, “Zygon” 1997, vol. 32, pp. 29–40; J.C. Flack, 
F. de Waal, Any Animal Whatever: Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and 
Apes, “Journal of Consciousness Studies” 2000, vol. 7, pp. 1–29; P. Boomgaard, Perspectives on 
de Waal’s Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, “Current Anthropology” 2008, vol. 
49, no. 4, pp. 695–704; H. Lyna, B. Franksc, E.S. Savage-Rumbaughb, Precursors of Morality 
in the Use of the Symbols “good” and “bad” in Two Bonobos (Pan paniscus) and a Chimpanzee 
(Pan troglodytes), “Language & Communication” 2008, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 213–224.
5  H. Kummer, op.cit., p. 33.
6  M. Bekoff, J. Pierce, op.cit., pp. 2–3.
7  E.g. C.J. Cela-Conde, On the Phylogeny of Human Morality (Ten Years Later), “Human 
Evolution” 1990, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 139–151; B.N. Waller, What Rationality Adds to Animal 
Morality, “Biology and Philosophy” 2002, vol. 12, pp. 341–356, R. Joyce, op.cit., pp. 75–85; J.R. 
Monroe, A. Martin, P. Ghosh, Politics and an Innate Moral Sense, “Political Research Quarterly” 
2009, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 621–632.
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Referring both to the latest fi ndings and most often mentioned and discussed 
experiments undertaken in primatology and to the commentaries upon them, 
I am going to analyze two topics. At the outset I would like to explore the funda-
mental problems associated with the defi nition of morality being used in studies 
about the question of morality in NHP (Section II). Then I will take a critical look 
at the best candidates for “moral prerequisites” in NHP, mainly empathy and 
the sense of justice (Sections III and IV). It should be treated as both a critical 
review of the heated dispute on the NHP morality topic and rather an invitation 
to discussion than an attempt to make defi nitive statements about this subject. 
In the fi nal conclusions I would like to clarify the contribution of studies on mo-
rality in NHP to the general “biologizing morality” approach.
Problems with morality defining
Morality is notoriously hard to defi ne and there is strong disagreement about 
how best to understand what morality is. In spite of this, one may notice that 
according to the dominant approach, the authors working on the topic under 
consideration have chosen (sometimes implicitly) a particular defi nition of mo-
rality and then presented the evidence and arguments confi rming or denying it 
adequateness to the NHP. Simply how we defi ne morality determines whether 
and to what extent NHP have basic elements of it. The content of the defi ni-
tion chosen determines later considerations and conclusions, because the line 
between non morality, proto-morality, the necessary but not suffi cient compo-
nents for morality, and indeed the genuine morality are to be found elsewhere 
in various attempts to describe “what morality is.” However, the more accurate 
and controversial question is: where to place the border between a prosocial be-
haviour (that benefi t other individuals and helps to maintain social peace and 
connections) and “genuine” morality.8 
By now we know from long term, controlled investigations that social traits 
like parental care, co-operative foraging, hunting and breeding, communal nurs-
ing as much as reciprocal kindness, exist to a considerable extent in the ani-
mals kingdom, especially in NHP. They have evolved specifi c emotional devices 
and perhaps emotional-based motivations needed to form and maintain a simple 
form of society. Grooming, removal of parasites and protection, traits common 
among social mammals and birds, cannot have been produced by prudent cal-
culation because those animals are not capable of computational work on this 
8  We should have in mind that Darwin has already sketched a shift from the social to the 
moral animal. The main Darwinian idea is that sociality was primary and the next evolutionary 
step “invented” morality. F. de Waal has been exploring such an idea in his conception that “mo-
rality [is] a direct outgrowth of the social instincts that we share with other animals” (Primates 
and Philosophers, p. 6). But Darwin strongly believed, some degree of “intellectualization” is 
necessary for the emerging “moralization.” As R. Joyce said: “one thing about which Darwin is 
obviously correct (...) is that something has to be added to pro social inclinations before we can 
speak literally of a ‘moral sense’, for a conscience requires a fair degree of cognitive sophistica-
tion” (op.cit., p. 101).
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scale. Nor are prosocial behaviours a deceptive cover for some other motives and 
purposes – animals are not skilled fulltime hypocrites. Social higher animals, 
including NHP, did not build their relatively stable societies by plotting their 
way out of a Hobbesian original war of all against all.9 What makes them able 
to live together, to co-operate in remarkable tasks of hunting, building and joint 
protection has to be their natural (biological) disposition formed by evolutionary 
forces. Yet is this enough for morality?10 Where should one draw the line that 
separates highly socialized species from those which exhibit morality? Where 
exactly does morality start?
In the broadly understood literature of evolutionary science there exist a va-
riety of defi nitions of morality. However, authors more frequently do not ask 
ontological questions (what is morality?), but give a list of features or conditions 
or mental capacities necessary for morality (what is necessary for morality to 
exist? what is the “set of required components of morality”? what are the indica-
tors of morality? what are the “empirical markers of morality”?). Yet the common 
defi nitional usage treats it as an empirical phenomenon functioning in a certain 
society (humans or NHP or even non primates animals) determining in social 
practice what is recognized or only fulfi lled as “good” and “bad.” Therefore, the 
authors have been interested about “social morality” – a description of moral 
practices exercised in particular society. Primatologists especially have never 
asked the question of whether ethics (normative, postulative morality) exists in 
NHP. Monkeys and apes do not make ethical considerations. As C. Zimmer put it 
clearly, “chimps may be smart, but they don’t read Kant.”11 In spite of practicing 
a descriptive account, it is diffi cult to specify the ontology of morality in a way 
that is noncommittal between moral theories and that does not import prescrip-
tive considerations into what ought to be a descriptive task. The case is even 
more complicated, because as M. Ossowska correctly notices, “establishing the 
borders of the morality notion is already a moral issue.”12
One may distinguish analytically between the different types of morality 
defi nitions by using criteria that sometimes may overlap each other. So called 
psychological defi nitions for the existence of genuine morality require specifi c 
internal states or processes which occur in consciousness.13 Most of the classical 
theories developed in philosophy have expressed a need for some kind of psycho-
9  The group of primatologists (R.W. Sussman, P.A. Garber, J.M. Cheverud, Importance of 
Cooperation and Affi liation in the Evolution of Primate Sociality, “American Journal of Physi-
cal Anthropology” 2005, vol. 128, pp. 84–97) have analyzed the literature on primate sociality, 
and concluded that the vast majority of primate social interactions are affi liative rather than 
agonistic and aggressive. They prefer to play or groom than fi ght. For example, in pro-simians, 
the most ancestral of existing primates, an average of 93.2% of social interactions are affi liative.
10  We know about the self-sacrifi cial behavior of ants or bees and according to the common 
opinion it does not constitute morality. Some have erroneously claimed that the undoubted social 
complexity displayed by chimpanzees, and the fact that they appear to follow rules, suffi ces for 
chimpanzees to be granted a moral sense (e.g. D. Harnden-Warwick, op.cit.).
11  C. Zimmer, Whose Life Would You Save?, “Discover” 2004, vol. 25, p. 5.
12  M. Ossowska, Socjologia moralności. Zagadnienia podstawowe (Sociology of Morality. 
Basic Problems), PWN, Warszawa 1986, p. 253.
13  E.g. moral judgments, other’s wellbeing regarding intentions and motives or even con-
ceptualizations of them, deliberative self-refl ective considerations on moral values, personal 
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logical occurrences for morality. P. Kitcher argues that morality involves much 
more than a mere “ability to adjust desires and intentions to the perceived wishes 
or needs of others.” It covers a capacity for refl ection on a variety of viewpoints, 
which gives rise to the standpoint for impartiality and “the genuinely moral sen-
timents”, that make us value “what is ‘useful and agreeable’ to people” in gener-
al.14 It is rare but primatologists also use psychological criteria to defi ne moral-
ity – for example H. Lyna, B. Franksc and E.S. Savage-Rumbaughb recognize 
that “at its very essence, morality must rely on moral judgments.”15 Meanwhile, 
also because of a lack of access to the subjective internal world of NHP, so called 
behavioural defi nitions restrict themselves to the necessary occurrence of the 
other regarding behaviours resulting in an increasing of well being (welfare) of 
the non-kin, non familiar or even different species agents (e.g. helping a drown-
ing chimpanzee by another chimpanzee; a chimp helping a bird).16 Exemplary 
use of this type of defi nition may be found in M. Bekoff’s and J. Pierce’s state-
ment, that morality is “a suite of interrelated other-regarding behaviours that 
cultivate and regulate complex interactions within a social group.”17
On a different level of analysis, one may distinguish the so-called (socio)
functional defi nitions where morality is treated holistically as a specialized 
subsystem within a social system fulfi lling functions such as making possible 
social integration, coordination and cooperation. A functional understanding of 
morality involves interpreting its consequences for the larger social structures 
in which they are implicated. For example, according to D. Copp, morality plays 
a cooperative and coordinating function.18 “The currency of a moral code” makes 
possible the reduction of confl icts, enhances cooperation and maximizes the real-
ization of individual needs and values. According to the famous primate research-
ers, morality arose from a silent agreement enabling individuals to take pay offs 
from “co-operative sociality.” Simply put – “morality plays a social function.”19 In 
opposition to the functional defi nitions, the so-called individual (or interactive) 
level defi nitions do not link moral phenomena with functional imperatives of 
social system but treat it as something connected with the self-perfection pro-
cess of a particular individual, as a quality possessed by individuals. Morality 
is analyzed at the individual level, without searching for holistic implications 
for the social system. E. Turiel codifi ed this individual-centred view of morality 
estimation of the values determining what is right and wrong, autonomous choice between 
alternatives; self-experience and fulfi llment of moral obligation.
14  P. Kitcher, Ethics and Evolution: How to Get Here from There [in:] Primates and Philo-
sophers, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006, pp. 132–133.
15  H. Lyna, B. Franksc, E.S. Savage-Rumbaughb, op.cit., p. 214.
16  Generally speaking, according to F. de Waal’s anecdotal report of “the survival of the 
weak, the handicapped, the mental retarded, and others who posed a burden was depicted as 
the fi rst appearance on the evolutionary scene of compassion and moral decency” (op.cit., p. 7).
17  M. Bekoff, J. Pierce, op.cit., p. 7.
18  D. Copp, Morality in a Natural World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, p. 13. 
19  F. de Waal, J. Flack, op.cit., p. 29. According to the different socio-funcional approach 
the functions of morality are: social ordering, maintenance and preservation of the community 
(D. Harnden-Warwick, op.cit., pp. 29–30), increasing help and increasing predictability in hel-
per or competitor (H. Kummar, op.cit., p. 44), confl ict resolution (Ch. Boehm, op.cit., p. 144), 
promotion of cooperation and harmony (F. de Waal, Primates and Philosophers, pp. 162–163).
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when he defi ned the moral domain as: “prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, 
and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other.” The moral 
judgments are derived “from features inherent to social relationships – includ-
ing experiences involving harm to persons, violations of rights, and confl icts of 
competing claims.”20
Another type of defi nition refers to the driving forces, a stimulus for moral 
choices or behaviours. The so-called emotion-based or affective defi nitions pay 
attention to the intuitionist and emotional way of making moral action (the au-
tomatic moral emotion based behavioural responses) or judgment (the sudden 
appearance in consciousness an affective valence without any conscious aware-
ness of purposes, intentions, reasons). The moral intuition has been defi ned as 
the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of 
an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) associated with emotions about 
the character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having 
gone through the steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.21 
According to this defi nition type, rational refl ection is not necessary for morali-
ty.22 Nevertheless “emotion” and “cognition” cannot fruitfully be contrasted, one 
may analytically distinguish so-called rationalistic defi nitions emphasise the 
role of self-refl ective analysis, rational decision making processes and the ratio-
nal thematization of emotions. In contrast to moral intuition, moral reasoning is 
a conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given information about 
people, situations, norms, consequences in order to reach a moral judgment or 
perform moral action. For example F. Ayala highlights three rationalistic ele-
ments of cognitive faculty necessary for morality: “(i) the ability to anticipate the 
consequences of one’s own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgments; and 
(iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action.”23
When we look at defi nitions of morality, we may notice that in most cas-
es behavioural and functional types are put together, just as the psychological 
and individual are. Such a simplifi cation allows us to defi ne four ideal types 
of morality defi nitions: (1) behavioural-functional and rationalistic, (2) psycho-
logical-individual and rationalistic, (3) behavioural-functional and affective, (4) 
psychological-individual and affective. Most defi nitions presented in the litera-
ture concerning the problem of morality in NHP might be ascribed to the psy-
chological-individual and rationalistic or behavioural-functional and affective 
types. Using the former type of defi nition often leads to advanced scepticism 
and criticism or even precluding of morality existence in NHP.24 Relying on the 
20  E. Turiel, The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1983, p. 3.
21  J. Haidt, F. Bjorklund, Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology 
[in:] W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol. 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: 
Intuition and Diversity, MIT Press, Cambridge 2008, p. 188. 
22  B.N. Waller, op.cit., p. 345.
23  F. Ayala, What the Biological Sciences Can and Cannot Contribute to Ethics [in:] F. Ayala, 
R. Arp (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2009, 
p. 317. 
24  E.g. D. Povinelli, L. Godfrey, R. Laurie, The Chimpanzee’s Mind: How Noble in Reason? 
How Absent of Ethics? [in:] M.H. Nitecki, D.V. Nitecki (eds.), Evolutionary Ethics, State Uni-
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psychological-individual and rationalistic defi nitions support the claim that hu-
mans and humans alone possess morality. Yet on the other hand, understand-
ing morality in a functional-behavioural and affective way gives a much better 
basis for fi nding the basic elements or even genuine morality in NHP. Generally 
speaking, in a radical interpretation of the functional-behavioural account, the 
unique features of human morality are simply species – specifi c way of fulfi lling 
functions common to all highly social animals. The difference between human 
morality and NHP morality is not only a matter of degree but the matter of spe-
cies dependent way of fulfi lling the same function. In accordance with it morality 
is treated as “broad adaptive strategy for social living that has evolved in many 
animals societies other than our own.”25 It leads some authors to point that “mo-
rality must be understood as species relative.”26 So there is not only cultural 
but also species specifi c variance in morality exhibition (the so-called inter spe-
cies relativity thesis). This perspective centres on the fact that in their worlds, 
animals may indeed have their own form of genuine morality. The consequence 
of maintaining such a position is to recognize that “replication of the human 
moral precepts need not be a defi ning characteristic of the moral sense in differ-
ent species.”27 Functional-behavioural defi nitions do not allow us to distinguish 
between either morality from pro-social behaviour and the non-moral normative 
faculty or moral norms from other social norms. 
Even a mere look at the discussions over the question of NHP morality has 
shown that many irresolvable dilemmas, non conclusive disputes and blind al-
leys have their basis in defi nitional and conceptual weaknesses. Concluding, the 
main problems with defi ning morality in primatological and related literature 
are: (1) there is no commonly accepted defi nition of morality – the kind chosen 
determines the conclusions reached; (2) researchers do not specify in full what 
morality is, despite the fact that they present evidence for or against its existence 
in NHP; (3) authors most often give a set of requirements for morality but not “by 
genus and difference” defi nition; (4) in consequence there is no easy way to distin-
guish between morality and the necessary elements but not enough for it, as well 
as between morality and pro-social behaviour and a mere capacity for normative 
guidance; (5) it is often not explicitly articulated if authors write about morality 
or the capacities necessary for it; (6) authors write about “proto morality”, “pre-
requisites for morality” or the “building blocks of morality” but at the same time 
commentators criticize the stronger thesis that morality exists in NHP.
versity of New York Press, New York 1993, pp. 309–321; W. Güth, S. Güth, Morality Based on 
Cognition in Primates, “Journal of Consciousness Studies” 2000, vol. 7, no. 1–2, p. 44; J. Kagan, 
Human Morality is Distinctive, “Journal of Consciousness Studies” 2000, vol. 7, no. 1–2, p. 47; 
J. Joyce, op.cit., pp. 75–85.
25  M. Bekoff, J. Pierce, op.cit., p. 3.
26  B. Johnson, J. Pierce, Morality in Animals: Yes, No, Maybe, Paper Presented at Fifth 
Annual Joint Environmental Philosophy Meeting in Allens Park, Colorado May 27th–30th 
2008, p. 3.
27  D. Harnden-Warwick, op.cit., p. 32.
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Empathy in non human primates
Let us move from the defi nitional considerations toward an examination of 
the more specifi c arguments. The increasingly common opinion tells us that we 
should not explain in morality evolutionary terms without referring to emo-
tions.28 Generally speaking, the basic emotions are widely acknowledged to be 
adaptive mechanisms, each designed by biological natural selection to perform 
a task that involves physiological, psychological, and behavioural elements of 
the organism in such a way as to encourage it to respond adaptively to recur-
rent types of fi tness-relevant threats and opportunities in the environment. Set 
against this background, studies conducted in primatology have been trying to 
describe a possible continuity from emotion, social emotions, moral emotions to 
complete morality. Some authors believe that a fundamentally important mech-
anism of any emotional response is the psychological process known as empa-
thy.29
Empathy is a phylogenetically ancient and continuous phenomenon. 
Researchers think that the “empathetic” effect in mammals is mediated by 
common brain mechanisms. It refl ects evolutionary continuity in a pro-social 
mechanism among many different species. Because empathy is grounded in the 
same neurological architecture as other pro-social behaviours such as trust and 
reciprocity it seems likely that a whole suite of interlinked behaviours have co-
evolved in social mammals.30 Empathy may be an important component of cer-
tain helping, cooperative and “moral” behaviours, by facilitating, for example, re-
ciprocal altruistic interactions and forming trust-based relations (trust involves 
being able to assess the intentions and emotions of interaction partners). The 
capacity for more fl exible, nuanced and complex empathic responses seems to 
be correlated with both social complexity and mental capacities.31 Yet empathy 
28  Psychology has shown that human morality has to some degree emotional roots and an 
intuitive foundation (e.g. J. Haidt, F. Bjorklund, op.cit.). Neuroscience has proved that moral 
dilemmas activate emotionally involved brain areas (e.g. D. Loye, The Moral Brain, “Brain and 
Mind” 2000, vol. 3, pp. 133–150; J. Moll, R. de Oliveira-Souza, F. Krueger, J. Grafman, The 
Neural Basis of Human Moral Cognition, “Nature” 2005, vol. 6, pp. 799–809).
29  S. Preston, F. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, “Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences” 2002, vol. 25, pp. 1–72; F. de Waal, Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: 
The Evolution of Empathy, “Annual Review of Psychology” 2008, vol. 59, pp. 279–300.
30  Empathy is possibly the basis of these pro-social behaviors, but it does not deny using 
it to manipulate and taking strategically games which needed highly complex mind reading 
capacities. The ability to read and understand intentions also facilitates manipulation and 
deception, and the capacity to imagine how one’s own behavior affects others can lead to the 
most extreme forms of cruelty.
31  As Preston and de Waal explain: “The emotional state of one individual has the potential to 
elicit a similar state in nearby individuals. This emotional linkage has been present in primitive 
forms through much of the evolutionary history of chordates in the form of alarm and vicarious 
arousal. This basic linkage was then augmented by enhanced cognitive and emotional abilities 
through evolution and extended ontogeny (development of the individual), allowing individuals 
to experience empathy in the absence of releasing stimuli, towards more distant individuals, 
and without being overwhelmed by personal distress” (op.cit., p. 3).
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is not a single phenomena, but a whole class of different processes. It occurs in 
nested levels, with the inner core a necessary foundation for the other layers. 
According to F. de Waal the inner core consists of relatively simple and cogni-
tively basic forms of empathy such as emotional contagion, which are largely 
automatic and too rapid to control voluntary physiological mechanisms that 
“provides an observer (the ‘subject’) with access to the subjective state of anoth-
er (the ‘object’) through the subject’s own neutral and bodily representation.”32 
A more complex physiological and psychological mechanism is concern for the 
other (sympathetic concern), that is the ability to perceive and perhaps rep-
resent another individual’s emotional state and make behavioural attempts to 
ameliorate this state by enhancing his well being. The most complex form is the 
perspective-taking (capacity for attribution), in which an individual can fully 
adopt the other’s perspective, using imagination with an understanding of the 
reasons. Evolution, of course, doesn’t toss out one adaptation and replace it with 
another; it adds to and adapts existing structures and capacities. More complex 
forms of empathy have evolved from simpler, older forms which, in turn, prob-
ably stem from even more simpler and older mechanisms. According to F. de 
Waal’s Russian Doll Model, higher cognitive levels of empathy have been built 
upon a fi rm, hard-wired basis.33 Let us critically look to the presented evidence 
for empathy in NHP by referring only to most often mentioned and discussed 
experiments.
1. Emotional contagion
Emotional contagion is an “emotional state-matching of a subject with an 
object.”34 The emotional state of one individual, or even a whole group is being 
transmitted and in effect co-determines the emotional state of observer. On that 
level, the perception of the emotional state of another automatically activates 
shared representations which cause a matching emotional state in the observ-
er. A relatively old experiment demonstrated emotional contagion by monkeys 
when another individual displayed emotional distress yet there have been no 
experiments with apes to date since the ethical restrictions neglect the repetition 
of this classic experiment.
J. Masserman, S. Wechkin, W. Terris experimentally investigated a ba-
sic form of “empathy” among rhesus macaques.35 One monkey, the actor, was 
trained to pull on either of two chains to receive food. The experimenters altered 
the situation so that pulling the chain with the larger reward caused a monkey 
32  F. de Waal, Homo homini lupus?..., p. 27; see S. Preston, F. de Wall, op.cit.
33  Thus empathy covers a wide range of phenomena related to emotional linkage, from the 
simple and automatic to the very complex and sophisticated. There is a considerable literature 
about the neural basis of empathy to be found in the so called mirror neutrons; see G. Rizzolatti, 
L. Craighero, Mirror Neuron: A Neurological Approach to Empathy [in:] J.P. Changeux et al. 
(eds.), Neurobiology of Human Values, Springer, Berlin 2005, pp. 107–123.
34  F. de Waal, Putting the Altruism..., p. 282.
35  J. Masserman, S. Wechkin, W. Terris, ‘Altruistic’ Behavior in Rhesus Monkeys, “American 
Journal of Psychiatry” 1964, vol. 121, pp. 584–585.
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in sight of the subject to be shocked. Another monkey, the receiver, was intro-
duced in a cage, while the actor’s chains were rewired. One chain would still de-
liver smaller-reward food to the actor, but the other administered both a larger 
food reward and an electric shock to the receiver. Most monkeys substantially 
reduced the number of pulls to the shocking chain. Researchers noticed that 
from the subjects which witnessed the shock of the conspecifi c, two-thirds pre-
ferred the nonshock chain even though it resulted in half as many rewards. Of 
the remaining third, one stopped pulling the chains altogether for 5 days and 
another for 12 days after witnessing the shock of the object. In a different ex-
perimental setting, macaques were fed only if they pulled a chain which caused 
an electric shock to an unrelated peer who was in plain view through a one-way 
mirror. Refusing to pull the chain meant starvation yet most monkeys routinely 
refused to pull the chain. Only 13% chose to gain food despite the causing of 
pain to a conspecifi c. Amazing 87% of macaques starved themselves to prevent 
the shock to the conspecifi c. Starvation was induced more by visual than audi-
tory cues, was more likely in animals that had experienced shock themselves, 
and was enhanced by familiarity with the shocked individual. Monkeys who had 
been shocked before were signifi cantly less likely to shock their neighbours, as 
were monkeys with prior social contact. The study showed that a hungry rhesus 
monkey would not take food if doing so subjected another monkey to an electric 
shock. The monkeys also refused to pull a chain that delivered them food if doing 
so gave a painful shock to a companion. This “empathetic” response was auto-
matic, in most cases stronger than a food stimulus and leads to the improvement 
of other’s states.36 
We should point that vicarious distress shown in this experiment is not neces-
sarily altruistic (in its biological and psychological meaning). Perhaps animals 
use the distress of others as a sign for danger. If an animal is peacefully foraging 
for food and it hears a conspecifi c cry or scream, it will probably stop foraging and 
seek a safe place, because the cry or scream indicates the presence of a danger. 
Failure to respond in this way would be profoundly maladaptive. Consequently, 
the possible interpretation of these experiments is that monkeys do not reveal 
much concern for their fellows. Even the monkeys who starved themselves may 
have done so because they were afraid of being shocked.
36  Recent research goes even further. D. Langford and his colleagues (D.J. Langford et 
al., Social Modulation of Pain as Evidence for Empathy in Mice, “Science” 2006, vol. 312, pp. 
1967–1970) demonstrate that mice suffer distress when they watch another mouse experience 
pain. The researchers discovered that mice who watch their peers in pain were more sensitive 
to pain themselves. A mouse injected with acid writhed more violently if his or her partner had 
also been injected and was writhing in pain. Not only did the mice who watched cagemates in 
distress become more sensitive to the same painful stimuli, they became generally more sensitive 
to pain, showing a heightened reaction, for example, to heat under their paws. The researchers 
speculated that mice probably used visual cues to generate the empathic response, which is 
interesting since mice normally rely most heavily on olfactory communication. This data was 
interpreted as a confi rmation of the ancient, probably present in all mammals, roots of empathy.
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2. Sympathetic concern
In certain circumstances, individuals are concerned about another’s state and 
make behavioural attempts to ameliorate this state. It is a more sophisticated 
psychological mechanism which might lead to forms of empathic response in 
which the observer perceives the emotional state of another, “feels sorry for” this 
emotional state and tries to do something e.g. to alleviate the source of distress or 
offering comfort. So empathy may just remain a feeling state, but it also may mo-
tivate some action.37 The best example of such a mechanism is active consolation, 
which means “reassurance by an uninvolved bystander to one of the combatants 
in a preceding aggressive incident.”38 In most cases, the third party goes over to 
the loser and gently puts an arm on his shoulders. It is not a kind of postconfl ict 
resolution and separation of the fi ghting sides. The target of the consolation is 
a party who has lost a meaningful fi ght or dispute. There is evidence that conso-
lation reduces post confl ict stress in a recipient of antagonistic aggression.39 The 
argument is that to provide reassuring contact to a recipient of aggression, thus 
helping the recipient reduce its postconfl ict stress, a bystander may be required 
to perceive the distress of the recipient and act emphatically. F. de Waal asserts 
that the kind of empathy underlying consolation is more cognitively complex and 
more highly developed in great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans) than 
in monkeys where there is no proof of consolation existing.40 
Yet there also exist different explanations of the evolutionary function of con-
solation. Perhaps consolation could be explained by individual fi tness enhance-
ment because chimpanzees are particularly responsive to the distress of not all 
but only valuable partners.41 It may be part of an exchange system between 
partners – the consoler may derive benefi ts by receiving consolation or other 
valuable behaviour in the future. It has also been suggested that consolation 
37  We know much about so called “warm-glow effect,” that is pleasant feelings associated 
with improvement of another’s condition. According to one of the latest fi ndings, when human 
participants do good deeds they report feeling good. Subjects doing something good also show 
activation of reward-related brain areas; M. Steger, T. Kashdan, S. Oish, Being Good by Doing 
Good: Daily Eudaimonic Activity and Well-being, “Journal of Research in Personality” 2008, 
vol. 42, pp. 22–42.
38  F. de Waal, Primates and Philosophers, p. 33. According to different defi nition consolida-
tion is “affi liation directed from a third party toward the recipient of aggression;” O.N. Fraser, 
D. Stahl, F. Aureli, Stress Reduction Through Consolation in Chimpanzees, PNAS 2008, vol. 
105, no. 25, p. 8557.
39  O.N. Fraser, D. Stahl, F. Aureli, op.cit.
40  F. de Waal, Homo homini lupus?..., p. 26. Monkeys seem to lack this particular level of 
empathy. For example, we know that Macaque mothers fail to comfort their own offspring after 
a fi ght. They do not display signs of distress when their offspring are targets of aggression nor do 
they increase post confl ict affi liative contacts with their offspring, suggesting that they may be 
unable to perceive their offspring’s need for distress alleviation; G. Schino, F. D’Amato, A. Troisi, 
Maternal Aggression in Lactating Female Japanese macaques: Time Course and Interindividual 
Variation, “Canadian Journal of Zoology” 2004, vol. 82, no. 12, pp. 1975–1979.
41  O.N. Fraser, D. Stahl, F. Aureli, op.cit.; see contrary data in: R.M. Wittig, Ch. Boesch, 
The Choice of Post-Confl ict Interactions in Wild Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), “Behaviour” 
2003, vol. 140, p. 1543.
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reduces the likelihood of further attacks among all group members. Therefore 
it is advantageous to both consoler and recipient. According to another expla-
nation, consolation in chimpanzees serves a protective function by specifi cally 
reducing the risk of the consoler becoming the target of further aggression from 
the original recipient of aggression. Simply “it avoids an opportunity of further 
aggression.”42 Moreover, Fraser et al. accurately point that “the bystander’s be-
haviour and emotional state, however, are critical areas for further research to 
evaluate whether the consoler contacts the recipient primarily to reduce their 
own or the recipient’s distress.”43 At fi rst glance, consolation is the best candi-
date for the proof of the existence of sympathetic concern in chimpanzees, but 
from a closer look there are also a few different explanations which are possible 
as well.
3. Perspective-taking
The forms of empathy discussed above work relatively automatically and do 
not need complex cognitive abilities. However, when we talk about empathy as 
the capacity to understand the other, the adoption of the other’s point of view, 
more advanced cognitive machinery is needed. It generates quite a new situation 
when we are using imagination and mental state attribution to take our em-
pathetic perspective. Then perspective-taking not need to be necessarily based 
on direct presence of stimulus, but only on our mental representation of it. An 
example of such a capacity is target helping, that is “help and care based on cog-
nitive appreciation of the other’s specifi c need or situation.”44 The result of such 
help is the archiving of other’s goals in even novel situations which needs an 
understanding of why the other’s state arose. Target helping is cognitively (the 
helper must know something about the goal the other is attempting to achieve as 
well as the obstacles to that goal and also needs to be more situation responsive 
and fl exible) and motivationally (the helper must exert effort to help another 
person – with no immediate benefi t to oneself) complex behaviour.45 It requires 
the distinction between the self and the other that enables the other’s situation 
to be separated from ones’ own as a base for non automatic “empathetic” reaction 
on changes in the other’s state.
One way to determine if target helping exists in NHP is to design a com-
parative experimental setting with some NHP species and human infants.46 As 
opposed to the previous experiments, F. Warneken and M. Tomasello did not 
use food and examined helping a human rather than a conspecifi c because it is 
42  R.M. Wittig, Ch. Boesch, op.cit., p. 1529.
43  O.N. Fraser, D. Stahl, F. Aureli, op.cit., p. 8561.
44  F. de Waal, Putting the Altruism..., p. 285.
45  Most scientists think that target helping requires the possession of a capacity of mirror 
self recognition (MSR). In his classic paper G. Gallup proposed phylogenetic coemergence be-
tween the development of perspective-taking and the emergence of MSR.
46  As the authors claim “such a comparison may enable us to distinguish aspects of altruism 
that were already present in the common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans from aspects of 
altruism that have evolved only in the human lineage;” F. Warneken, M. Tomasello, Altruistic 
Helping in Human Infants and Young Chimpanzees, “Science” 2006, vol. 311, p. 1301.
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possible that helping behaviour is more likely when they involve objects that 
are not food. They created four categories of situations: out-of-reach objects, ac-
cess thwarted by a physical obstacle, achieving a wrong (correctable) result, and 
using wrong (correctable) means. They then tested preschool age infants and 
human-raised juvenile chimpanzees in each protocol. In the reaching problem, 
all chimpanzees helped reliably in the fi ve tasks but the chimpanzees did not 
help reliably in the other types of experimental situation – that is, in those in-
volving physical obstacles, wrong results, or wrong means. As the authors put it, 
“children and chimpanzees are both willing to help, but they appear to differ in 
their ability to interpret the other’s need for help in different situations.”47 Apes 
possess some capacities for target helping but they do not possess enough devel-
oped abilities of the mental reading of others.48
The next experiment, conducted at the Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary 
in Uganda, tested if semi-wild chimpanzees spontaneously target help both hu-
mans and conspecifi cs regardless of reward prospects.49 The investigators set out 
to determine the precise circumstances under which chimpanzees are willing to 
assist either humans they barely knew or conspecifi cs on whom they had never 
depended. The authors also tried to rule out the role of immediate return-benefi ts 
by manipulating the availability of rewards. Different experimental protocols 
were conducted. In the fi rst setting, the chimpanzee saw a person unsuccessfully 
reach through the bars for a stick on the other side, too far away for the person, 
but within reach of the ape. The chimpanzees spontaneously helped the reaching 
person regardless of whether this yielded a reward or not. A similar experiment 
with 18-month-old children gave exactly the same outcome, but the replication 
of the experiment with capuchin monkeys showed that, contrary to chimps and 
children, capuchins look for their own personal pay-offs.50 Obviously, both apes 
and young children (but not capuchins) are willing to help, especially when they 
see someone struggling to reach a goal. The second experiment increased the 
cost of helping. The chimpanzees were still willing to help, however, even though 
now they had to climb up a couple of metres and the children still helped even af-
ter obstacles had been put in their way. Rewards had been eliminated altogether 
this time, but this did not change the chimps and children helping behaviour51 
as opposed to capuchins which “seem to be very sensitive to the amount of effort 
required to help.”52 This seems to suggest that apes target helping, as opposed 
47  Ibidem, p. 1302.
48  This conclusion should be referred to the broad discussions over the possession of mind 
reading capacities (sometimes called theory of mind) by NHP. 
49  F. Warneken, B. Hare, A.P. Melis, D. Hanus, M. Tomasello, Spontaneous Altruism by 
Chimpanzees and Young Children, “PLoS Biology” 2007, vol. 5, p. 184.
50  J.L. Barnes et al., Helping Behaviour and Regard for Others in Capuchin Monkeys 
(Cebus apella): An Evolutionary Perspective on Altruism, “Biology Letters” 2008, vol. 4, no. 6, 
pp. 638–640. 
51  According to one interpretation, chimpanzees living in a Ngamba sanctuary help humans 
because they depend on them for food and shelter. Authors suggest that the use of food rewards 
in experimental studies like this one may obscure the propensity for helpful behavior because 
chimpanzees treat all interactions involving food as part of a zero-sum game.
52  J.L. Barnes et al., op.cit., p. 639.
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to monkeys, is not based on a cost/benefi t calculation, as is so often assumed.53 
The responses observed in these experiments have been interpreted by authors 
as genuinely other-oriented. Obviously apes possess capacities for target help-
ing in simple situations without the prospect of a reward but in more complex 
experimental settings they could not adequately “read the others mind” and, in 
effect, could not target help.
The mushrooming literature on NHP’s empathy has given a new set of in-
teresting hypothesis that should be critically analyzed or even falsifi ed. I have 
shown that Waal’s theory, while very attractive from the fi rst look, raises many 
doubts, questions and also alternative and simpler explanations after more com-
prehensive exploration.
Sense of fairness and fairness-related emotions
The problem of the existence of a “minimal sense of fairness” in NHP consti-
tutes the next strongly discussed issue. F. de Waal and his colleagues have long 
argued that such moral component and numerous fairness-related emotions are 
homologous to psychological systems in other primates.
The fi rst experiment examining explicitly how non human primates respond 
when treated unfairly was conducted by J. Brosnan and F. de Waal.54 The ex-
perimental design consisted of putting capuchin monkeys in two adjacent cages. 
The monkeys had been trained to exchange coins for food with the human experi-
menter. They are given a coin and have to give it back in order to receive a piece 
of food, which is visible in a transparent bowl in front of them. In one condition, 
the two capuchins are given a similar reward, a piece of cucumber. In a second 
condition, one monkey receives a piece of cucumber, while the second monkey 
receives a piece of grape – a highly valued food. In a third condition, designed 
to elucidate the role of effort, one monkey receives a piece of cucumber, while 
the second monkey is given a piece of grape without having to exchange it for 
a coin. The four conditions were designed to elucidate the effect of the presence 
of the reward on subject behaviour – grapes were visible but not given to another 
capuchin. The question was whether capuchin monkeys exhibit inequality aver-
sion [IA] treated as a building block of the sense of fairness. There are two kinds 
of inequality aversion: disadvantageous IA – disliking it if another individual 
53  The third and fi nal experiment tested the chimps’ willingness to help using more complex 
experimental design. One chimpanzee (Partner) tried to enter a closed room with food. The 
Observer would watch his attempts. The only way for the Partner to enter this room would be 
if a chain blocking the door were removed. This chain was beyond the Partner’s control and 
only the Observer could unlock it. So there is a situation in which all of the food would go to 
the Partner, thus may potentially cause some emotional response (envy) in the Observer. The 
results surpassed expectations because Observers removed the peg holding the chain, and 
in effect yielding their Partner access to the room with food. Generally one would think that 
rewards, even if not strictly necessary, would at least stimulate helping behaviour, but in fact 
they seem to play no role at all.
54  S. Brosnan, F. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, “Nature” 2003, vol. 425, pp. 297–299.
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receives more than yourself, and advantageous IA, disliking it if you receive 
more than another individual. To measure the rate of rejection by monkeys as 
an indicator of the IA, the cases where the monkeys do not exchange the coin or 
throw it away were numbered. The results were surprising: female capuchins 
reject at a much higher rate the piece of cucumber when the other capuchin is 
given a grape for a coin and at an even higher rate when the other capuchin is 
given a grape for free. This was interpreted both as a proof of the existence of 
disadvantageous inequality aversion in capuchin monkeys and strong evidence 
for expectations about the fair distribution of food. This “fi nding suggests that 
precursors to inequity aversion are present in animals from which our lineage 
split millions of years ago.” They did not arrive de novo, after all evolution works 
gradually step-by-step. According to F. de Waal, “the evolution of the fairness 
principle starting with resentment if you get less, then moving to concern about 
how others will react if you get more, and ending with declaring inequity a bad 
thing in general.”55 With cooperation comes increased sensitivity concerning who 
gets what for their effort.56 
Similar results were received in experimental studies using the same protocol 
on chimpanzees.57 This confi rms that, like capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees oper-
ate at the level of disadvantageous IA, but not advantageous IA. Chimpanzees 
decline to complete the exchange interaction when their partner receives a supe-
rior reward for the same amount of effort. Furthermore, there is no effect of the 
subject’s gender or their rank relative to their partner. Whereas the chimpan-
zees respond to reward discrepancies, they do not appear to respond to discrep-
ancies in the level of effort. It is surprising, especially because researchers previ-
ously found evidence that capuchin monkeys do show such a discrimination. The 
authors found the strongest reactions to the exchange task with grapes and cu-
cumber between chimpanzees who were least familiar with each other, whereas 
the members of a colony that had lived together for over three decades barely 
reacted at all. Chimpanzees respond to inequity in a variable manner, which 
could be caused by such variables as group size and group-specifi c traditions. 
To fi x a problem emerging from the possible intervention of the human ex-
changer on the monkey performances, J. Brosnan, J. Freeman, and F. de Waal58 
55  F. de Waal, Joint Ventures Require Joint Payoffs: Fairness among Primates, “Social 
Research” 2006, vol. 73, no. 2, p. 363.
56  S. Brosnan and F. de Waal even wrote about the norms of fair distribution, as well as 
evidence for social emotions similar to human moral outrage: “people judge fairness based both 
on the distribution of gains and on the possible alternatives to a given outcome. Capuchin mon-
keys, too, seem to measure reward in relative terms, comparing their own rewards with those 
available, and their own efforts with those of others. They respond negatively to previously ac-
ceptable rewards if a partner gets a better deal. Although our data cannot elucidate the precise 
motivations underlying these responses, one possibility is that monkeys, similarly to humans, 
are guided by social emotions. These emotions, known as ‘passions’ by economists, guide human 
reactions to the efforts, gains, losses and attitudes of others, op.cit., p. 299.
57  S. Brosnan, H. Schiff, F. de Waal, Tolerance for Inequity May Increase with Social Close-
ness in Chimpanzees, “Proceedings of the Royal Society B” 2005, vol. 272, pp. 253–258.
58  S. Brosnan, C. Freeman, F. de Waal, Capuchin monkey’s (Cebus apella) Reactions to 
Inequity in an Unrestricted Barpull Situation, “American Journal of Primatology” 2006, vol. 
68, pp. 713–724.
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developed a new study to investigate inequity aversion in capuchin monkeys. 
They used the already well established and checked “cooperative barpull situa-
tion.” A team replaced the setting in which human experimenter was or wasn’t 
giving a reward for exchange to the case when rewards were mechanically placed 
(or not) in a bowl as the result of a cooperative task. This enabled the subjects 
free access to the apparatus, which let them decide the conditions under which 
they were willing to participate, and rewards were either equitably or inequita-
bly distributed. To receive food they should collaborate with a peer in pulling the 
bar. The authors predicted that (1) “pairs would be less likely to be successful in 
obtaining food in the unequal situation, in which the rewards differed, than in 
either the high- or low-value situations, in which the rewards were equal;” (2) 
“related individuals would be more successful in all situations.”59 Contrary to the 
fi rst predictions, the capuchins did not alter their behaviour depending on the 
equity of the reward distributions in this cooperative task. Pulling success did 
vary with the baiting of the reward cups, but the key factor was whether high-
value grapes were present in the test, not whether the reward cups were baited 
with the same food of either high or low quality, or with different-quality food 
(one high and one low quality). This differs from previous results that indicated 
distributional inequity, but may be explained by signifi cant differences in the ex-
perimental settings.60 So the reward distribution was not the major motivating 
force since the data shows no indication that the equity of reward distribution 
was a factor in whether a pair was successful in any given trial; rather, the pres-
ence or absence of high-value grapes appeared to matter the most. This result is 
somewhat different from previous fi ndings, which suggested negative reactions 
to inequity. To some degree the second prediction was confi rmed: related pairs 
were more than twice as likely to be successful at pulling in the tray as their 
unrelated counterparts.
The new experiment on capuchin monkeys was conducted to check a larger 
subject pool two hypothesis: greed and frustration.61 According to the fi rst, capu-
chin monkeys respond negatively to unequal reward distributions because of in-
dividual expectations of better rewards based on the past (frustration), according 
to the second because of the mere presence of such rewards (greed). Importantly, 
researchers used an experimental design (“exchange for tokens paradigm” in-
stead of the “cooperative barpull situation”) from the fi rst Brosnan and de Waal’s 
study which confi rmed that capuchin monkeys show only one component of “fair-
ness” – inequality aversion. The results show that capuchin monkeys react nega-
tively to situations in which they receive a less-favoured reward than their part-
ner for the same task, and “control procedures suggest that this response was 
solely due to the discrepancy between the monkey’s own and the other’s rewards 
and not to individual factors such as greed or frustration.”62 Energy expenditure 
signifi cantly modifi es the inequity response: greater individual effort increases 
59  Ibidem, p. 716.
60  Ibidem, p. 721.
61  M. van Wolkenten, S. Brosnan, F. de Waal, Inequity Responses in Monkeys are Modifi ed 
by Effort, but Not Other Individual Factors, “Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences” 
2007, vol. 104, pp. 18854–18859.
62  Ibidem, p. 18857.
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the negative response to distributional inequity. Simply put, the sensitivity to 
reward inequity is combined with a sensitivity to individual energy expenditure. 
The authors found that there were no signifi cant differences between male and 
female subjects in their performance. 
In spite of enthusiastic conclusions emerging from Brosnan and Waal’s fi rst 
experiment, there are strong objections over the question as to whether their 
work really provides evidence that a specifi c sense of fairness is a homologue 
which is present among capuchins, chimpanzees and humans. Firstly, Brosnan 
and de Waal found no effect for male capuchins. This is curious if they have real-
ly identifi ed a homologue of a human inclination to a fair distribution of windfall 
gains. However, among chimpanzees, there was no evidence of a sex differences 
in response.63 The last study confi rmed that capuchin males and females were 
equally likely to react to inequitable treatment.64 Secondly, J. Henrich has noted 
a problem with Brosnan and de Waal’s proposal.65 He argues that humans tend 
to react very differently in similar conditions as female capuchins in the fi rst 
experiment. When they are offered goods that they judge to be unfair, humans 
in many cultures reject this deal which causes a negative feeling in the person 
who offered the deal. However, when rejecting the deal does not hurt the person 
who offered the unfair deal, which is a situation analogous to the second and 
third conditions in Brosnan and de Waal’s experiment, people tend to accept 
the deal, in sharp contrast with capuchins.66 He cites evidence that humans will 
accept inequitable pay if they have no reason to think that rejecting that pay 
will have any impact on those who are receiving more. Moreover, Henrich and 
colleagues have documented that there is much cross-cultural diversity in the 
norms bearing on the distribution of windfall gains. Thirdly, we should note both 
that Brosnan, Freeman, and de Waal67 failed to replicate capuchin monkeys’ 
aversion to inequity in a different experimental design, as Bräuer, J. Call and 
M. Tomasello failed to replicate chimpanzees’ aversion to inequity.68 In studies 
which confi rm the AI thesis, the responses were elicited in a situation in which 
the experimenter controlled the distribution and the primates had no control 
over the result. Fourthly, Brosnan and de Waal’s experimental design has also 
been severely criticized. The problem with the application of Brosnan’s stud-
ies of inequity aversion is confounded by the fact that the individuals could not 
63  S. Brosnan, H. Schiff, F. de Waal, op.cit., p. 258.
64  M. van Wolkenten, S. Brosnan, F. de Waal, op.cit.
65  J. Henrich, Inequity Aversion in Capuchins?, “Nature” 2004, vol. 428, p. 139.
66  J. Henrich et al., “Economic Man” In Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments 
in 15 Small-Scale Societies, “Behavioral and Brain Sciences” 2005, vol. 28, no. 6, pp. 795–815; 
discussion, pp. 815–755. 
67  S. Brosnan, C. Freeman, F. de Waal, op.cit., p. 724. In the most recent study have showed 
problem with fi nding a inequality aversion in capuchins and falsifi ed negatively basic Brosnan 
and de Waal’s hypothesis; A. Silberberg et al., Does Inequity Aversion Depend on a Frustration 
Effect? A Test with Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella), “Animal Cognition” 2009, vol. 12, no. 3, 
pp. 505–509. 
68  J. Bräuer, J. Call, M. Tomasello, Are Apes Really Inequity Averse?, “Proceedings of the 
Royal Society B” 2006, vol. 273, no. 1605, pp. 3123–3128. They proposed “the food expectation 
hypothesis” which states that “seeing another individual receive high-quality food creates the 
expectation of receiving the same food oneself – and not inequity aversion.” 
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directly correct inequitable outcomes; in fact, “by rejecting ‘unfair’ offers, they 
were actually increasing disadvantageous inequity.”69 Fifthly, C. Wynne notes 
that cucumber-receiving monkeys also refuse rewards in a control condition, in 
which they see grapes being placed in a pile nearby rather than seeing grapes 
being given to another monkey.70 The natural interpretation is not that monkeys 
have a sense of equity, but rather that they will turn down mediocre rewards 
when something better is in view.71 
Conclusions
The main question which is asked by primatologists concerns if and eventual-
ly to what degree NHP possess “moral precursors,” “prerequisites for morality,” 
“the evolutionary building blocks of morality”? It helps us to establish whether 
or to what degree our common ancestor was a “moral being” and contributes to 
the debate if and eventually to what extent morality is indeed an evolved trait 
or if it is a purely cultural phenomenon. The last problem refers to the questions 
of if (and eventually to what degree) morality is an inherent element of human 
nature and if (and eventually to what degree) we share our nature with other 
species, especially NHP. From the broadest philosophical perspective, primatolo-
gist’s fi ndings may contribute to the question as to how unique are human claims 
to be moral. 
More precisely speaking, the studies on NHP are supposed to supply new 
data necessary for the answering of the question: what (if any) elements of moral 
domain constitute an adaptation (a trait whose evolution is the result of natu-
ral selection) in the homologous (traits that evolved in a common ancestor and 
that remain present in related species due to common phylogenetic descents) 
or analogous (similar traits that arose by convergent evolution due to the pres-
ence of similar selection pressures or evolutionary conditions) form. There is 
the second evolutionarily probable scenario: morality might be an exaptation 
(features of organisms that evolved because they served some function, but are 
later co-opted to serve a different function, which was not originally the target 
of natural selection). To sum up, studies in primatology should return to the 
question of whether morality is homologous, analogous for humans and NHP 
or constitutes an exaptation trait (or perhaps is a purely cultural product). Of 
course some primatologists defend the “homology” scenario (at least for some 
69  K. Jensen, B. Hare, J. Call, M. Tomasello, What’s In It for Me? Selfregard Precludes Al-
truism and Spite in Chimpanzees, “Proceedings of the Royal Society B” 2006, vol. 273, p. 1013.
70  C. Wynne, Fair Refusal by Capuchin Monkeys, “Nature” 2004, vol. 428, p. 140.
71  This is simply an instance of the famous Tinklepaugh effect. Tinklepaugh in 1928 showed 
that monkeys will turn down an otherwise desirable food reward (lettuce), when a more desirable 
reward has been observed (bananas). Watching another monkey receive grapes is a more exciting 
stimulus; a moving conspecifi c is harder to ignore. In addition, while watching another monkey 
eat grapes, the capuchin with the cucumbers might become increasingly aware of the fact that 
she could be enjoying those grapes as well; O. Tinklepaugh, An Experimental Study of Repre-
sentative Factors in Monkeys, “Journal of Comparative Psychology” 1928, vol. 8, pp. 197–236.
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moral components e.g. sense of fairness)72 but others prefer the “analogy” one.73 
Interestingly, there has been no analysis referring to the most probable exapta-
tion hypothesis. I have shown that some traits (empathy, sense of fairness) that 
might seem to be good candidates for having evolved as an adaptation (homology 
or analogy) may, on further and deeper examination, turn out to be rather poor 
candidates. We should bear in mind that looking for homologues or analogies 
of the components of moral psychology is always a tricky business and requires 
careful attention to a range of data from multiple fi elds of scientifi c inquiry to 
ensure that there are no strong reasons to doubt that these components evolved. 
To understand why a specifi c trait evolved, one needs to recognize and clearly 
describe what was the fi tness function of such a trait and how that trait func-
tioned in its ancestral environment. Yet if one critically examines primatological 
literature on morality-related topics, he will fi nd many ambiguities and a lack of 
a precise conceptual background. I think that it is time for primatology to move 
from the situation of many particular studies that are unrelated and not based 
on common defi nitional and methodological assumptions to the highly synchro-
nized inter species project of searching “proto-morality” or “the evolutionary 
building blocks of morality” in NHP. The similar shift happened in the so-called 
cultural primatology, where interesting but inconclusive single experiments and 
fi eld studies have been supplemented by multiannual, multinational and well-
planned collaboration.74 
72  J. Flack, F. de Waal, op.cit.; F. de Waal, Good Natured...; idem, Homo homini lupus?...; 
idem, Primates and Philosophers; S. Brosnan, F. de Waal, op.cit.; Ch. Boehm, op.cit.; H. Lyna, 
B. Franksc, E.S. Savage-Rumbaughb, op.cit. 
73  H. Kummer, Analogs of morality...; M. Bekoff, J. Pierce, op.cit.
74  See M. Stępień, Kultura prymatów innych niż człowiek jako wyzwanie dla nauk społecz-
nych (Non-Human Primates Culture as a Challenge to Social Sciences), “Studia Socjologiczne” 
2008, vol. 4, no. 191, pp. 43–66.
